Publications

“Subnational executive offices as stepping-stones to defeat authoritarian leaders”, Democratization,2025

This article examines how opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes can leverage subnational executive offices to defeat autocrats. While existing research emphasizes coalition-building as a central strategy for opposition success, this study highlights the pivotal role of subnational electoral victories in shaping national-level outcomes. I argue that controlling subnational executive offices enhances the opposition’s chances by signalling regime vulnerability and increasing the belief that national-level victory is achievable. Moreover, winning these offices also contribute to opposition success by fostering coalition-building, as perceptions of regime weakness make coalitions more likely. The study supports these arguments with an original dataset covering 1990–2022 and employing a probit model, mediation analysis, and regression discontinuity design. These findings offer new insights into opposition strategies and electoral dynamics in authoritarian regimes.

Under Review

“Opposition Pockets in Competitive Authoritarianism: Subnational Contestation and Its National Consequences”

This article examines how opposition-led subnational governments shape political competition in competitive authoritarian regimes. I develop the concept of opposition pockets to analyze how strategies of opposition leaders and responses of autocrats interact to produce different outcomes. Using evidence from Ankara, Diyarbakir, and Istanbul, the article shows how subnational victories can either remain locally contained, be eliminated, or evolve into platforms with national political consequences.

Works in Progress

“Gatekeepers of Change: Internal Party Democracy and Opposition Success in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes”

This project investigates the role of internal party democracy in determining opposition success in competitive authoritarian regimes. While subnational victories often strengthen opposition prospects, some parties elevate popular local leaders to national prominence while others sideline them, weakening their chances in national contests. I argue that the difference lies in the inclusiveness of internal party rules: democratic candidate selection procedures create pathways for viable subnational leaders, whereas centralized, elite-driven systems often block them in favor of long-standing figures. Drawing on comparative evidence from Mexico and Turkey, the project shows how internal party democracy conditions the ability of opposition forces to convert local victories into national breakthroughs. It contributes to debates on opposition strategies and regime change by demonstrating that structural opportunities are not sufficient unless parties are institutionally prepared to seize them.

“Wake-up Call: How Subnational Victories Alert Autocrats to Looming Defeat”

This project investigates how opposition victories at the subnational level, while often strengthening opposition prospects nationally, can also accelerate authoritarian retrenchment. By signaling regime vulnerability, such local wins serve as a “wake-up call” that prompts autocrats to tighten their grip to avoid looming defeat. I test this argument through cross-national statistical analysis and a case study of Turkey after the 2023 elections. The project contributes to debates on democratization and authoritarianism by showing that effective opposition strategies can open democratic possibilities in some contexts while provoking authoritarian closure in others.